What was labeled “the worst maritime disaster involving a British registered ship in peacetime since…1919”¹ was the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise March 6, 1987. Of the 459 passengers and 80 crewmembers, 193 perished. But for roll-on, roll-off (RORO) car and passenger ferries, capsizing is not unusual because of free surface effect (see Other RORO Vessel Incidents, below).

Roll-on, Roll-off (RORO) Ships

Herald of Free Enterprise

The weather was good at the Belgian port of Zeebrugge that early spring evening. A light easterly breeze swept across the port and sea was relatively calm. The Herald of Free Enterprise ferry was preparing to cross the English Channel for Dover and many of the passengers had taken advantage of an advertized low fare and were returning to England from vacationing on the continent.

The Herald was owned by Townsend Car Ferries, Ltd., a subsidiary of the Peninsular and Oriental (P&O) Steam Navigation Company. It was one of three ships of the Spirit class branded Townsend Thoresen, which were built specifically for fast loading and unloading and quick acceleration. The bows of the Spirit ships had two sets of watertight doors.

Before the leaving the harbor, the Assistant Boatswain normally closed the doors before the ship released its cables (“dropped moorings”) that secured the ship to the dock. But this day, he had taken a break and was asleep in his cabin when the harbor-station’s call sounded and the ship dropped its moorings. The Boatswain testified that he had put a chain across the last car loaded but it was never his job to close the door or make sure that anyone was there to close the doors.

The First Officer usually stayed on deck to make sure the doors were closed, but this day he had returned to the wheelhouse to stay on schedule. The Captain could not see the doors from the wheelhouse and the wheelhouse had no indicator lights for doors open or closed. He could only assume that the doors were closed. And although it is normal practice for ferries to set sail with the doors open, there was another mitigating factor; the Captain had not fully drained the bow ballasts which had been filled with sea water (lowering the bow) to facilitate loading the ferry.

The ship left harbor at 6 pm and passed the outer breakwater about 25 minutes later. The bow already was low (only about 2.5 meters above the water line), and the forward motion of the ship caused low pressure that sucked the bow further downward. The doors remained open, and soon the car deck began taking on large quantities of water. The resulting free surface effect compromised her stability and in mere seconds she began listing 30 degrees to port (left). Close to 6:30 pm, she capsized. The water reached the electrical systems; main and emergency power was disabled and the ship went dark. A last-minute turn toward starboard caused the ship to capsize onto a sandbar, which kept it from sinking entirely in deep water and prevented more deaths.

A nearby dredger noticed the Herald's lights disappear and notified shore. A rescue helicopter arrived within 30 minutes, followed by members of the Belgian Navy. Most of those who perished succumbed to hyperthermia from the near-freezing water temperature (3^oC; 37.4^oF).  

The Investigation

Investigators of the U.K. Department of Transport ultimately decided that the capsizing was not caused by any of the factors considered :

• the route (Dover to Zeebrugge) was not a normal route for the Herald
• the ship was too high for the loading ramp at the dock to reach the upper car deck without filling front ballasts with sea water (lowering the bow) 
• water depth, height, and volume
• the ship's speed

Investigators did find that the capsizing was “partly caused or contributed to by serious negligence in the discharge of their duties” by the Captain, First Officer, and Assistant Boatswain and partly by the fault of ship owner, Townsend Car Ferries (a subsidiary of P&O). The First Officer was suspended for two years, the Captain and Assistant Boatswain for one year. Townsend Ferries was ordered to pay £50,000 (about $77,000) toward a fund for surviving crew members and £350,000 (about $540,000) to the Secretary of State for Transport for investigation costs.

However, the Boatswain and Assistant Boatswain were commended for “exemplary behavior” when the boat capsized. The Boatswain organized rescue efforts from the bridge and passenger spaces. The Assistant Boatswain, awakened when he was rocked out of his bunk by the capsizing motion, made his way to the hull to rescue trapped passengers, badly cutting his forearm while breaking window glass; he continued his rescue efforts until he was overcome by the cold and bleeding.⁴

After-effects

As a result of this incident¹, the ferry operator (P&O) made several changes:

• Removed the Townsend Thoresen brand from the ferries; rebranded as P&O European Ferries and repainted the formerly red hulls blue
• Added indicators on the bridge that display whether bow doors are open or closed
• Fitted watertight ramps to the bow sections
• Fitted “freeing flaps” so flood water can drain from a vehicle deck
• Omitted the bow door on some vessels 

In addition, the International Maritime Organization prohibited an open deck the length of the Herald on passenger RORO vessels.

Lessons Learned

Lesson that can be learned for this incident include:

• Inherent safety: Design and engineering to maintain low levels of danger even if things go wrong
• Safety-critical items: Install equipment or systems whose malfunction can prevent death or serious injuries; such items in this case might have included warning lights, draught meters so Captain know the bow’s clearance from waterline, clear personnel back-up procedures (the company had refused several requests for such equipment)
• Safety culture: Instill a culture of safety and teamwork throughout the organization
• Normal way of operating: Enforce safety-critical procedures to ensure teamwork and reinforce safety culture with backup roles and double-checking for readiness; in this instance, the normal ways of operating proved not good enough

Other RORO Vessels Incidents

The Herald of Free Enterprise is but one of several RORO vessels that took on water and capsized or sank because of problems with loading doors or vehicle decks:⁵

• MV Princess Victoria in 1953, 132 people died
• SS Heraklion in 1966, more than 200 died
• The Wahine disaster in 1968, 52 died
• MS Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987, 193 died
• MS Jan Heweliusz in 1993, 55 died
• MS Estonia in 1994, 852 died
• MS Express Samina in 2000, 80 died
• MS al-Salam Boccaccio 98 in 2006, almost 1000 died
• MV Queen of the North in 2006, 2 passengers were lost 

References

Photographs

1. Roro faehre.jpg. By Wolfgang Hägele. Wikipedia from the Wikimedia Commons (a freely licensed medial file repository. Online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Roro_faehre.jpg  Accessed 02 September 2010.
2. Source: File: Herald of Free Enterprise.jpg by Franz Golhen. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. From the Wikimedia Commons, a freely licensed media file repository. Online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Herald_of_Free_Enterprise.jpg  Accessed 02 September 2010
3. Ferry disaster remembered. (6 March 2002) BBC News. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1856771.stm  Accessed 30 August 2010.

Videos

1. The MS Herald of Free Enterprise Disaster in ZeeBrugge Belgium (2.36 min). Online at http://www.5min.com/Video/The-MS-Herald-of-Free-Enterprise-Disaster-in-ZeeBrugge-Belgium-120003786  Accessed 11 September 2010.
2. Herald of Free Enterprise (documentary, 22.55 min). Online at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-6542554776084132038#  Accessed 11 September 2010.

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