Map Source: Latest Earthquakes in the World - Past 7 Days

2007 Haiti—A Modern Point of Reference

The warnings were there. In 2007, an earthquake hazard study concluded a worst-case forecast of a 7.2 Mw earthquake along the Enriquillo-Plantain Garden fault in the Caribbean. A 2008 Haiti newspaper article warned of a high risk of major seismic activity.

Then it happened. January 12, 2010, Haiti, with a population of about 9.7 million, was devastated by a catastrophic earthquake that lasted 60 seconds and measured 7.0 on the Richter scale; January 24 the U.S. Coast Guard reported 52 aftershocks measuring 4.5 or greater since the initial quake. Vital infrastructure was damaged. At this writing, the number of deaths is undetermined but estimates range from 10,000 to 20,000.

Before January 12, Haiti was a poor country that barely had resources to sustain its population. Now the situation is worse as the world clamors to help. Reports and images from Haiti are recent and raw and can hint at what occurred in 1999 in Izmit, Turkey—a major industrial conglomeration of petrochemical plants, car manufacturers, tire companies, paper mills, steel fabrication plants, cement plants, pharmaceutical firms, and other industries.

About Izmit

Izmit is the administrative center of the Kocaeli province—an area with a population of about 20 million (about one-third of Turkey’s total population). It lies almost directly over the North Anatolian fault, at the intersection of the Eurasian and Anatolian plates. This fault is characteristically similar to California’s San Andreas fault. It extends across the length of northern Turkey to the Agean Sea and is one of the most energetic earthquake zones in the world.

In 1939 an earthquake with an estimated magnitude of about 8.0 Mw devastated the city of Erzincan, near the fault’s eastern end point, and killed about 33,000 people. Over the next 60 years, another 10 earthquakes of magnitude 6.5 or greater occurred along the North Anatolian fault. The danger was acknowledged by officials who, since 1947, required incorporation of sophisticated earthquake-resistant building standards. The earthquake code was adapted from the U.S. Uniform Building Code after the 1939 Erzincan earthquake (8.2 Mw). A modern reinforced concrete standard was prepared in 1969.

 
 

1999 Earthquake

So Izmit, like Haiti, had warnings. And at 3 a.m. August 17, 1999, a 45-second earthquake of 7.4 Mw shook the North Anatolian fault. The epicenter was about seven miles southeast of Izmit and was felt 200 miles away. The U.S. Coast Guard reported 52 aftershocks measuring 4.5 or greater in the 12 days after the initial quake. Immediately, a massive international aid effort was launched.

This was the largest earthquake event on record to have devastated a modern industrialized area since the Tokyo earthquake of 1923. In Turkey more than 17,000 people were reported dead, 43,959 injured. Some estimate the actual death toll may have been as high as 40,000. Some 120,000 homes were damaged beyond repair and an estimated 600,000 people were left homeless.

A team of engineers from EQE International investigated the Izmit earthquake almost immediately after it occurred. They reported that, “One of the most spectacular aspects of this earthquake is the damage to buildings inflicted directly by the faulting.” In its preliminary report, the EQE estimated that at least 20,000 buildings collapsed or suffered heavy damage and most of the deaths were caused by the collapse of residential and commercial buildings averaging four to eight stories tall.  

 

 

Effects on Tüpras Refinery

The Turkish Petroleum Refineries Co. (Tϋpras) is Turkey’s largest industrial enterprise. In 1990, Tϋpras became privatized after years as a state economic enterprise. Today, the company operates four oil refineries with a total of 28.1 million tons annual crude oil processing capacity. 

In 1999, the company’s largest refinery was in Korfez, just south of Izmit. It was designed and built with assistance from U.S. companies in 1961 (before current earthquake construction standards), and produced about 220,000 barrels per day—roughly one-third of Turkey’s total production of refined petroleum products. The earthquake damage at the Korfez refinery was so publicized and spectacular that it remains a subject of study yet today.

When the earthquake occurred, it caused oil spills, structural collapses, and refinery fires that burned out of control for days:

  • Four floating-roof naptha tanks burned uncontrollably and fire spread to crude and product tanks, jet fuel tanks, and gasoline tanks—a conflagration that forced evacuation of a three-mile area, interrupted search-and-rescue operations, and disrupted train service
The site’s stored water (36,000 m3) was depleted the first day, largely due to multiple breaks in the supply pipeline. Neighboring cities and countries (such as Bulgaria, and Germany) sent 89 firefighting trucks, aircraft dropped foam, and two diesel pumps drew water from Izmit Bay. After five days the fire was extinguished.
 
  • A 115-meter (350-foot) high, reinforced concrete heater stack  at the refinery collapsed into the unit and onto a pipeway, cutting or damaging 63 product and utility lines
As a result, a fire at a naptha line from the burning naptha tanks was difficult to extinguish because of the tank farm fires.
 
  • A warehouse fire in a chemical storage area was allowed to burn itself out

  • The Tupras private port facility (about 15 meters water depth) suffered sheared piles, partial collapse of a steel frame pipeway, and damaged supply and return lines
Multiple spills at the port were evident but reports of the causes of spills varied. One marina measured oil three to six inches thick before recovery measures began. 

Lessons Learned

The risks posed by earthquake activity along the North Anatolian fault had been known for decades.  Most of the devastation associated with the 1999 earthquake occurred not because the threat was not anticipated, but because of improper or shoddy design and construction. According to the EQE report:

  • The loss of life and building collapse was avoidable

Turkey’s building code for earthquake design is very similar to California’s.  But many new buildings were damaged or destroyed because they were not properly designed or constructed, or were located on ground that failed from shaking or faulting.

  • Severe industrial losses also were avoidable 

Most of the losses were caused by the collapse of structures that would have been expected to collapse, had they been properly evaluated, or were caused by equipment that was not properly anchored or braced to resist earthquake forces.  None of this should have been surprising; EQE noted that “to date, there are no significant new lessons with respect to structural behavior” arising from the Izmit investigation.

  • The damage to the Tϋpras refinery was unsurprising 

The site is on soft soils, near a major fault. The damage to the refinery and to other petrochemical plants in the region “could have been avoided with better earthquake resistance structural design, systems design, and planning.”  The damage could have been even more devastating if the fire had spread to the nearby processing units.

The Tϋpras refinery was not unique.  Many other oil, gas, chemical and petrochemical, storage, and other large industrial facilities around the world face similar risks that have not been properly evaluated and mitigated to ensure that their construction conforms to current standards for earthquake resistance. In the words of the EQE report, when a major earthquake strikes in an area where such facilities are concentrated, such as the industrialized region around Tokyo Bay, “the losses and the resultant environmental damage could be staggering.”

References

 

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